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Censorship and the Jews of Baghdad: Reading between




This study examines how members of the Jewish community
of Baghdad used foreign newspapers and journals to bring to
light and gain international sympathy for issues concerning the
community and its relationship with the Iraqi regime during
the early years of the Iraqi state (roughly 1930–1950). As an
example of this phenomenon, the article examines a 1934 case
in which authorities arrested E. Levy, author of a letter to the
Manchester Guardian telling of the confiscation of foreign
Jewish newspapers sent to Iraq and the opening of letters
addressed to Jews by postal officials. Subsequent to his arrest,
the community was not discouraged from writing in the for-
eign press. On the contrary, members of the Jewish commu-
nity, both anonymously and by name, wrote in Jewish and
non-Jewish foreign presses imploring the world to intercede
on Levy’s behalf and to bring to light the situation afflicting
the Jews of Baghdad. This article argues that foreign media
was a successful tool for the Jewish community of Baghdad as







In Iraq, the British Mandate lasted from 1920 until 1932. In the long
history of the region, this short period of the Mandate is often considered
“the Best of Times” for the majority of Iraq’s religious and ethnic min-
ority groups.1 For the Jewish community of Iraq, this period is often
considered the apex of social and cultural integration into general Iraqi
society. The community was bolstered by Jewish socio-economic mobility
due to an extensive (Jewish) community-sponsored education system and
an increase in white-collar employment opportunities in both the civil
service and with foreign firms. It was also a time of relative intellectual
freedom with little government censorship and increased access to foreign
print media.
CONTACT Sasha Goldstein-Sabbah s.r.goldstein@hum.leidenuniv.nl Leiden University, Matthias de
Vrieshof 1, Leiden 2311BZ, the Netherlands.
1Peter Sluglett, “Minorities under the Iraqi Mandate and Monarchy: The Best Years of their Lives?” (paper presented
at Leiden University, May 13, 2015).
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However, the end of the Mandate in 1932 and the death of King Faisal in
1933 were met with concern in regard to the future of the relatively pluralist
society which had developed and, as some would argue, foretold the beginning
of the end for over two thousand years of Jewish life in Iraq. The 1930s
represented a time of unease as the new state experienced political instability
and unrest. Although not to be compared with the political turmoil and
violence of the 1940s, for the Jewish community of Baghdad there was a
perceivable difference in state policy in regard to the Jewish community after
the Mandate ended. These changes included greater legislation in regard to
education, unofficial quotas on the amount of Jews employed in the civil
service, the official banning of Zionism (in 1935) as an ideology, greater anti-
Jewish sentiment in the local press, and the censuring of both Jewish period-
icals and post from abroad destined for Jews residing in Iraq. Although much
attention has been given to the history of the Jewish community of Iraq in
academic circles during the past decade, little work has specifically focused on
how the Jewish community (both on a communal and on an individual level)
perceived and reacted to these changes in the Iraqi state during this liminal
period from the end of the Mandate of the 1920s to the chaos of the 1940s, and
particularly on the question of competing loyalties between the Iraqi state and
Jewish nationalism as embodied in the Zionist political movement.2
In this article, I will explore how different actors in Baghdad reacted to one
specific episode within the Jewish community surrounding the censorship of
foreign Jewish periodicals and post in 1934. Specifically, I examine the
incident caused by Mr. Isaac Levy3 when he published a letter in the
Manchester Guardian criticizing the Iraqi government’s policies towards
Jews in Iraq in regard to the censorship of foreign Jewish press and the
opening of letters destined to or being sent by members of the Jewish
community by postal offices. The sources for this article are based on
Jewish and non-Jewish newspaper articles from 1934 to 1935, to understand
how both the international and local publics were presented with the situa-
tion. I have used internal correspondence from the British Foreign Office
that discusses the incident to understand how the Jewish community reacted
on an official level to these new restrictions and how they used their
connections with foreign Jewish communities, foreign governments, and
the Iraqi government to protest the Iraqi state. Finally, to understand how
a member of the Iraqi Jewish elite reacted to the incident, I have used a yet
unpublished, secret report written by a member of the Baghdad Jewish lay
council delegate to the Iraqi parliament, Ibrahim Nahum. Nahum was also
the agent in Baghdad of the wealthy Eastern Baghdadi Kadoorie family who
2Orit Bashkin, New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).
3In the English language press and private correspondence, both Levy’s first and last name appear in different
formats. Specifically, his last name is also cited as Levi, Lewi, Lawee, and his first name is referred to as Eliahou.
Given that each report is identical, the author assumes they are referring to the same bookshop owner.
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were based in Shanghai and Hong Kong. It was in this capacity that he had a
letter smuggled out of Baghdad by an unnamed, non-Jewish English friend.
The friend, in turn, sent the letter to Sir Elly Kadoorie in Shanghai. To date,
it is the first private, candid account of this incident that I have come across.
The letter is unique in that it presents Nahum’s detailed views of the Jewish
situation in Iraq divorced from any concerns of censorship that are often
apparent in regular postal correspondence or published material from the
period.4
Political unrest and censorship
Censorship and the banning of newspapers, in general, had always been part
of print culture in Iraq, causing local writers and publishers to self-censor.
The Ottoman Laws regulating print culture were reapproved in 1921 and
1931, requiring publishers and sellers of print media to be in constant
communication with the Ministry of the Interior.5 Failure to abide by these
laws put publishers and booksellers at risk of having their business shut down
and being sentenced to prison if their publications overstepped the defama-
tion laws. This fact meant that, although printing and publishing flourished
during the Mandate and early years of the state, the scope of publications was
heavily balanced toward literature and areas not perceived as politically
sensitive. With this factor in mind, foreign press and, particularly, non-
Arabic press became extremely important in providing information on
areas which the government was susceptible to censor.
Unlike the majority of the Iraqi population in the mid-1930s, the Jewish
community of Baghdad was relatively literate, a fact noted with frequency
when discussing the influence of secular education. If a large portion of Iraqi
Jews were able to read in multiple languages by the 1930s, this was certainly
due to the sizeable portion of Jews in Baghdad who had received instruction
in French, English, Hebrew, and Arabic (to varying degrees),6 making the
community significantly more literate than the general Iraqi population of
the time.7 This education was provided, in large part, by an extensive and
varied network of Jewish schools which, by 1930, included eighteen separate
institutions, many of which received funding from foreign Jewish institutions
and individuals located outside of Iraq, adding an additional layer of
4In the majority of correspondence from Nahum to the Kadoories and vice versa, the issue of censorship is
omnipresent. For example, to discuss the position of Jews in Iraq, they often use the weather as a metaphor or
reference an individual’s health. When discussing Nahum’s personal situation, they often reference a common
friend, “Mr. Smith.” None of these metaphors are used in this report.
5Orit Bashkin, The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008),
37–38.
6S.R. Goldstein-Sabbah, “Jewish Education in Baghdad: Communal Space vs. Public Spate,” in Modernity, Minority,
and the Public Sphere: Jews and Christians in the Middle East, edited by S.R. Goldstein-Sabbah and H.L. Murre-van
den Berg (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2016), 96–120.
7Abbas Shiblak, Iraqi Jews: A History (London, UK: Saqi Book, 2005), 44.
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multiculturalism to the Jewish community.8 Given the multilingual nature of
Jewish education in Baghdad, it is not surprising that many members of the
Jewish community of Baghdad subscribed to both Jewish and non-Jewish
foreign press, in addition to local press in Arabic and English, the latter a
remnant of the Mandate period. The exact subscription and readership
numbers are almost impossible to glean, as no records exist. Additionally,
it is likely that foreign press was both shared via informal networks and
consulted in the numerous cafes, libraries, and private Jewish clubs, further
complicating the calculation of any concrete readership numbers. However,
based on the list of censured Jewish newspapers from 1934, we know that
there were at least sixteen foreign Jewish newspapers with subscribers in
Baghdad in that year. Of these newspapers, nine were published in Hebrew,
four in English, one in Arabic and, surprisingly, one in Yiddish.9 The
majority of these newspapers came from Mandate Palestine, while others
were published by Jewish communities in Beirut, Cairo, London, Bombay,
and Shanghai. In particular, the latter two locations had Eastern Baghdadi
satellite communities with strong ties to Iraq whereby their journals regularly
carried holidays greeting and letters from residents of Baghdad and Basra.
The Indian periodicals had a specific interest in Jewish life in Baghdad
whereby they carried more original information on Jewish life in Iraq
compared to Jewish newspapers in other regions. Many of these special
pieces on Iraq were anonymous reports, and it is highly likely that they
came from the residents of Baghdad. That the Jews of Baghdad were inter-
ested in these foreign and local newspapers attests to an interest in interna-
tional Jewish news, general foreign news, and local news.
During the Mandate period, although censorship existed (as already men-
tioned), there are no records of censorship specifically targeted towards members
of the Jewish community or foreign Jewish press. The case in point being the local
Arabic language newspaper, al-Misbah, which was published from 1924–1929,
focusing on specifically Jewish issues. Its second editor, Salman Shina, was an
avowed Zionist and identified al-Misbah as a Zionist paper without causing
scrutiny from the censors.10 And yet, although numerous literary reviews contin-
ued to be owned and edited by prominent Jewish intellectuals within Baghdad,
there was no official publication of the Jewish community or a publication
specifically dedicated to reporting Jewish news in Baghdad within Iraq in 1934.11
8Zvi Yehuda, The Jews of Babylonia in the Second Millennium CE (Or Yehuda: The Babylonian Heritage Center), 62
[Hebrew].
9The National Archives of the UK, Kew—CO/733/275/4.
10Orit Bashkin, “Misbah (Baghdad), al-,” in Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World, edited by Norman A. Stillman,
Vol. 3 (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2010), 430–431.
11However, al-Hasid, a weekly literary periodical, whose own editor, Anwar Shaul, was a prominent Jewish
intellectual who would confront and attack the fascist ideas in Europe, it did not specifically represent the
Jewish community. Orit Bashkin, “al-Hasid (Baghdad), al-,” in Encyclopedia of Jews in the Islamic World, edited by
Norman A. Stillman, Vol. 2 (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2010), 370.
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That there was no longer a Jewish newspaper in and of itself may be a consequence
of this heightened censorship in the post-Mandate era and concerns of accusations
of conflicting loyalties.
Due to the lack of a local Jewish newspaper, I argue that Iraqi Jews went to
the foreign press for information on news related to the Jewish world, speci-
fically to gain information about topics sensitive to the Iraqi state and therefore
not often discussed in the Arabic language press. Additionally, many Jews (and
non-Jews) subscribed to the English language Iraq Times, a paper often cited as
the primary print source for general foreign news in Iraq during this period.12
While Arabic newspapers were also widely read and subscribed to, particularly
ones edited by local Jewish intellectual elites, these are rarely cited as a source
of news and more referred to for their interesting discussions of Iraqi society
and innovative literary styles.13 However, by 1934, it was becoming more
difficult to get foreign Jewish journals into the country due to an increased
level of surveillance for anything purported to have Zionist sympathies. British
foreign office reports first mention the censoring of foreign Jewish publications
in Iraq in September 1934.14 The initial mentions stem from inquiries sent to
the Foreign Office by the editors of Jewish newspapers from London and
Palestine. These newspapers had received notifications that their Iraqi sub-
scriptions had been cancelled due to a ban on the publications; although the
exact reason given is vague, all parties infer that the issue to relate to Zionist
ideology. During the same period, the Bombay-based Jewish Tribune wrote
directly to the Post Master General of Iraq, the Minister of the Interior, and
other Iraqi officials in regard to their paper not being allowed into the country.
The Indian Jewish newspapers never received a government response.15 That it
is the publishers of these newspapers inquiring about their importation status
would suggest that the subscription numbers were significant, as it is unlikely
that the canceling of a handful of subscriptions would have raised any notice
from the publishers.
Upon request from the Jewish publishers and the Anglo-Jewish Association,
the British Foreign Office began to make inquiries into the status of foreign
Jewish press in Iraq. This was all carried out in a discrete manner in an attempt
to draw little attention to what could potentially be a sensitive subject, this in
general being the tactic used by both foreign and local Jewish groups when
addressing sensitive subjects with the Iraqi government. However, the issue of
foreign Jewish newspapers being prevented from entering Iraq became public
record on October 2, 1934 when a letter sent to the editor of the Manchester
12The Iraq Times was an English-language daily newspaper published in Baghdad from 1914 until 1964. It is
consistently cited by Jews as the reference for world news in Iraq throughout its existence. See Nissim Rejwan,
The Jews in Baghdad: Remembering a Lost Homeland (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2004).
13Bashkin, New Babylonians.
14The National Archives of the UK, Kew—CO/733/268/6.
15“Iraqi Consulate Established in Bombay: Special Interview with Consul-General for India,” Jewish Tribune,
March 1935, 34.
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Guardian regarding the same concern was published. Unlike the previously
mentioned inquiries, this letter came directly from a Jew in Iraq:
Sir,—Iraq has become an intellectual prison; liberty of thought and belief have
become a myth. Apart from the strict censorship and muzzling of the local press,
all letters from Palestine are opened by the postal authorities before being delivered
to their owners.
Anti-Zionist and hence anti-Jewish, feeling (all Jews are suspected of Zionist
tendencies) is running high. A whole sale {sic} ban has been placed on Jewish
papers or on papers in defense of the Jews from all over the world. Papers from
England, America, France, Egypt, and Palestine have been confiscated without
legitimate reason. All books written in Hebrew are also suppressed. Books
addressed to the Chief Rabbinate of Bagdad have been confiscated.
The banning of Communist propaganda literature and of books of an obscene
nature is quite understandable; but to ban all Jewish papers published in England,
American, and France is an outrage which no-liberal minded individual can
tolerate.—Yours, &c, E. Levy. Al Rashid Library, Bagdad, Iraq September 24.
The letter was written by Isaac (also referred to as Ephraim and Eliahou in
different newspapers and correspondence) Levy, the Jewish owner of the Al
Rashid bookstore in Baghdad. The letter itself is surprising in its description
of the issue of censorship targeted at the Jewish community of Baghdad
during this period. Looking beyond the very direct message the letter com-
municated, it also provides information about E. Levy, the Jewish community
of Baghdad, and Iraqi society as a whole at this time. Although little personal
information about E. Levy is available beyond that he was a modest book-
seller of Persian origin,16 we can assume several points. We assume that he is
generally well aware of foreign press, as his bookshop was responsible for
importing the censured Jewish newspapers, and therefore probably was also a
purveyor of other foreign press which had a wider audience. It is also highly
probable that he received a secular education, given his profession and ability
to write in English. Finally, we can assume that he is squarely positioned in
the Baghdadi Jewish middle-class. As the owner of a bookstore, he would not
have been considered a member of the elite, a spot reserved for those who
controlled large import/export businesses or the few who held important
government positions, a fact confirmed via descriptions of him in British
Foreign Office correspondence and by Ibrahim Nahum, a member of the lay
council.17 Had he been a member of the elite, it is unlikely that he would
have opted to protest the policies of the state in such a public manner.
Instead, he may have discretely approached government officials himself or
he may have opted to lobby the government through back channels by
requesting help from foreign Jewish philanthropic organizations or local
16The National Archives of the UK, Kew—CO/733/268/6. Many Jews living in Iraq at this time were of Persian origin,




consuls, which is exactly what the lay council was doing in private at this
time.18
In fact, both the religious and lay councils were hesitant to publically
criticize the state during this period or link themselves as individuals or on
behalf of the community with anything remotely related to Zionism. The
clearest example of this is evidenced in a letter written by the chief of the
Jewish community in Baghdad, Sassoon Khadduri, in the local newspaper al-
Istiqlal, in which he condemns Zionism in no unclear terms and shows
support for the native Arab Palestinian population. That letter was sent less
than a year after the Levy letter was published in the Manchester Guardian.19
In contrast to this, the community continued to privately maintain links with
individuals associated with the Zionist movement, both in Mandate Palestine
and elsewhere, even traveling to Palestine for both business and leisure up
until the dissolution of the community.20 In general, the public language of
the community and its individuals remained nationalistic and patriotic dur-
ing this period, although in private correspondence individuals appear much
more conflicted by the political reality and their individual affinities to both
the Iraqi state and the Jewish people. 21
The more central question is what prompted Levy to act as such amaverick in
writing this letter, and why to theManchester Guardian in particular? What did
he hope to gain from writing such a critical piece in such a public space? Did he
think that this would lift the ban on Jewish newspapers or that the government
would stop opening letters addressed to Jews from abroad? And was he con-
cerned that there would be consequences in publishing a letter so critical of the
Iraqi state? Although none of these questions can be definitively answered, by
beginning to explore them we can understand how members of the very diverse
Jewish community of Baghdad negotiated the shifting political scene and public
opinion of the Jewish community in Iraq.
In hindsight (and perhaps also in foresight), Levy’s letter to the Manchester
Guardian was a complete folly, especially as the letter was published under
his own signature.22 That Levy chose to sign his name to the letter makes it
unique; other letters like this had been published before and after this
particular incident, but they were mostly published in Jewish newspapers
abroad with smaller readership bases and, more importantly, these appeared
as anonymous letters under names such as “an Iraqi Jew” or “Well Wisher,”23
18Hong Kong Heritage Project Archive, Hong Kong—SEK 8 C-001 A02/15.
19Al-Istiqlal (October 8, 1936). Reproduced in English in Norman A. Stillman, The Jewish of Arab Lands in Modern
Times (Philadelphia, PA: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1991), 389.
20The Hong Kong Heritage Project Archives, Hong Kong, and the Jewish foreign press cited in this article both
document this phenomenon.
21Bashkin, New Babylonians, 15–57.
22Hong Kong Heritage Project Archive, Hong Kong—SEK 8 C-001 A02/15. The National Archives of the UK—CO/
733/268/6.
23These two examples come from letters to the editor in the December 1936 issue of the Jewish Tribune published
in Bombay.
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even for much less contentious letters, such as the suggestion that Iraq
should have its own Jewish newspaper.24 Given the uniqueness of the letter,
one could be led to think that it was a forgery written to either hurt Levy
personally or the Jewish community in general. That being said, I believe that
the letter is legitimate. Had the letter been a forgery, it is reasonable to believe
that follow-up articles on Levy would have hinted at this idea; instead, there
is only mention of affidavits which attest to the veracity of the letter, and
Levy never contests his authorship. Secondly, both the British Foreign Office
records and the private letters of Nahum never allude to any doubt that the
letter is legitimate, nor does the lay council ever makes a public statement
about the incident.
We know that Levy sent his letter to theManchester Guardian only after it had
been rejected by all of the Arabic language newspapers in Baghdad.25 It is possible
that some newspapers in Iraq were sympathetic to Levy’s stance, but none were
willing to risk the repercussions publishing such a letter would have, given the
strict censorship laws regarding defamation of the state. Publishing the letter in a
foreign Jewish newspaper would also have been an option, as Jewish newspapers
were very receptive to these types of letters. In fact, copies of Levy’s letter were
published in the London Jewish Chronicle and the Hebrew- and English-language
Zionist press in Palestine once the story was picked up by the Jewish Telegraphic
Agency, although it is unclear as to whether this was Levy’s doing or if the
newspapers simply copied the letter from the Manchester Guardian.26 It is my
contention that Levy specifically sent this letter to a non-Jewish foreign newspaper
as a result of his frustration at being censured in the Iraqi press, and also out of
protest to the Jewish communal leadership whowere not publically addressing the
issues of censorship or challenging the state to reform its policies regarding the
opening of post. Finally, since Levy had a vested interest in the importation of
foreign Jewish press, as this was central to his livelihood, he had the most to lose
from a financial perspective in the interdiction of Jewish press entering Baghdad,
which could have also influenced him in making such a risky decision. Others
were surely put at an imposition by these bans and opening of post, but found
creative ways to smuggle letters and newspapers in and out of Iraq using non-
Jewish friends and colleagues. An example of this was the way in which Ibrahim
Nahum smuggled his report on the state of Jews in Iraq to the Kadoorie family in
Shanghai via an English acquaintance.
As negative as the predicament appears, it is clear, from the tone of the
letter, that the author has far from given up on Iraq as home for its indigenous
Jewish population. In his letter, Levy states that he finds the current govern-
ment policies unfair in equating Jewishness with Zionism, but not the idea of
24Ibid.
25JTA article, November 7, 1934, JTA online archives, http://www.jta.org/jta-archive/archive-page.
26JTA article, November 18, 1934, JTA online archives, http://www.jta.org/jta-archive/archive-page.
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government censorship as a whole to be problematic. This gives the impression
that he supports the government, and only wants to draw attention to this
particular issue that he feels is misguided. Noting that the banning of
Communist and obscene literature is understandable gives the impression
that he wanted to demonstrate that he is not against the Iraqi state and its
policies in their entirety, only their specific targeting of the Jewish community
on this particular issue. Additionally, he chose not to bring up the other issues
afflicting the Jewish community in Iraqi at the time—notably, the dismissal of
some Jewish civil servants, the denial of travel visas to Palestine for Iraqi Jews,
and a sharp rise in anti-Jewish writing in the Arabic-language Iraqi press27—all
of which the British Foreign Office and Ibrahim Nahum group together with
the issue of censorship as hardships befalling the Jewish community.
Therefore, the only logical explanation of Levy’s strategy is that he hoped
that his letter would incite international criticism for Iraq’s censorship policies
both from Jewish and non-Jewish sectors, who would, in turn, pressure the
Iraqi government to rescind their policies.
Consequences of the Manchester Guardian letter
In short, Levy was successful in drawing attention to the Iraqi state’s treatment
of the Jewish community, inciting international criticism of its policies. Shortly
after the publication of his letter, many Jewish and non-Jewish newspapers
published related stories in regard to the Jewish situation in Iraq.28 The other
immediate outcome of the publication of his letter is that Levy was thrown in
jail and charged with “intended libel and defamatory remarks damaging to
Iraq’s integrity.” This fact, in turn, was picked up in the Jewish and non-Jewish
foreign press along with the Arabic-language press in Baghdad, the foreign
press sympathizing with Levy, and the local press defending both the state’s
actions in regard to Levy and its general policies in regard to censorship. On
November 7, 1934, a short article was disseminated by the Jewish Telegraph
Agency to Jewish press around the world, informing them of the outcome of
the Levy letter. The piece noted that Levy had been arrested and jailed after the
publishing of his letter in the Manchester Guardian. It went on to state that
Levy had sworn affidavits from a number of Jews on the banning of Jewish
newspapers addressed to them and on the opening of registered mail sent to
them from other countries.29 Finally, it mentioned that the president and
council of the Baghdad Jewish community protested vigorously to the govern-
ment against the anti-Jewish tone of the Arabic press, but that the government
took no steps to halt the anti-Semitic agitation.
27This anti-Jewish writing is also technically illegal under the Iraqi censorship laws.
28Virtually all of the Jewish newspapers carried stories as information was distributed via the JTA. Additionally,
many U.K. periodicals also picked up the story.
29JTA Nov. 7, 1934, JTA online archives, http://www.jta.org/jta-archive/archive-page.
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The key points in the piece from the JTA is that Levy was not alone in his
complaint; he had sworn affidavits stating that his accusations were true,
meaning that others were willing to confront the government over this
injustice, although no names are ever given in print. Secondly, the piece
brought up an additional issue confronting the Baghdad Jews at the same
time, namely, the anti-Jewish tone of the Arabic press, an issue that Levy
exacerbated by publishing his letter, playing right into the initial Zionist
accusations of the Iraqi press. When reading the JTA piece quickly, one
may have the impression that the Jewish community leaders were publically
protesting the treatment of Levy. However, this was not the case; instead, the
Jewish community was publically protesting the fact that Levy was being
portrayed as a representative of the Jewish community within the local press,
once again showing their caution in publically avowing any opinion in
contrast with government policy.
In reality, the Jewish community in Iraq at the time was divided over the
letter written by Levy. On the one hand, it made a tense situation even tenser
when the Arabic papers increased their public accusations of Zionist sym-
pathies, questioning the loyalty and patriotism of Iraqi Jews using Levy’s
letter as evidence for the community’s Zionist sentiments. On the other hand,
in private, many Jews probably admired Levy and his maverick streak, for
standing up for his beliefs and questioning the state in such a public form.
This point is supported both by the affidavits supporting Levy and anon-
ymous letters from Baghdadi Jews published in foreign Jewish newspapers
defending him.30 This conflicted opinion is clearly evident in Nahum’s letter
describing the issue. Although he states that Levy’s actions are inappropriate,
aggravating an already tense situation, he does not defend the state’s actions,
only noting that the consequences of Levy’s actions were to be expected.
Nahum also does not question the validity of Zionist ideology, only mention-
ing that he understands why Zionism is unacceptable to the greater Arab
population. In regard to the foreign press, in general, Nahum believe that
they are sensationalizing the whole event, although it is unclear in his letter
whether he actually believes what he is saying or is simply trying to reassure
the Kadoories (and possibly himself).
Just as the Jews of Baghdad were debating Levy’s letter, they were garner-
ing greater attention from foreign Jewish communities over the Levy case,
but also the issues facing the community in Baghdad. This should be seen in
the light of global Jewish concern over the declining situation of the Jews in
Germany and a preoccupation with the rise in anti-Semitism felt in Europe.31
For example, the Jewish Tribune in Bombay interviewed the consul general
for Iraq in India on the subject of the Levy case, asking very direct questions
30Jewish Tribune, Bombay, March 1935, 33.
31Hong Kong Heritage Project Archive, Hong Kong—SEK 8 C-001 A02/15.
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in regard to the anti-Jewish sentiment in the Iraqi press and their general
impression of a growing anti-Jewish sentiment in Iraq.32 Beyond demonstrat-
ing the interest of events in Baghdad amongst Jewish communities abroad, it
also demonstrates the Iraqi government’s desire to ameliorate how they were
viewed in the foreign Jewish press. The interview reveals certain openness but
also a lack of coherence by the Iraqi government, in that they were willing to
allow the consul to be interviewed by a Jewish newspaper that had previously
been banned in Iraq under the pretence of Zionist leaning. The Iraqi state
most likely underestimated the reaction to the Levy case, and therefore the
interview was one attempt to de-escalate the tension surrounding censorship
of Jewish press.
Like the Iraqi state, the additional attention from foreign Jewish commu-
nities was an added stress for the Jewish communal leadership in Iraq, whose
general policy was to maintain political neutrality as much as possible and
avoid criticizing the Iraqi state. However, the communal leadership was not
idle. Discretely, the lay committee was lobbying the government both in
regard to the press-related issues and Levy’s imprisonment, first by sending
official letters requesting his release and greater censorship of anti-Jewish
press, and then, when these went unanswered, by sending an official delega-
tion of community leaders to the premier’s office to discuss the matter.33 The
British Foreign Office also made inquiries to the Iraqi government in regard
to the Levy case and the issues of censorship, these inquiries stemming from
a request to the Foreign Office from the Anglo-Jewish Association (AJA), the
main Jewish Philanthropic organization in the United Kingdom, which had
strong ties to Iraq going back many decades.34
It is unclear what prompted the AJA to contact the Foreign Office. The
most likely scenario was that they received a request from the Jewish lay
council in Baghdad as to how best to de-escalate the situation in a fashion
mutually suitable to the Jewish community and the Iraqi government.35 This
construction of the AJA and the Foreign Office acting as intermediaries
between the lay council and the Iraqi government for sensitive issues was
used consistently throughout the Mandate and the early years of the Iraqi
state, as is seen in the Foreign Office files.36
32Jewish Tribune, Bombay, March 1935, 33.
33Hong Kong Heritage Project Archive—SEK 8 C-001 A02/15.
34The Anglo-Jewish Association (AJA) is a British organization founded in 1871 to promote social, moral, and
intellectual progress among Jews, similar to the Alliance Israelite Universelle in France. That AJA took a particular
interest in Iraq is partially due to Britain’s role in Iraq during the Mandate. However, another important factor
predating the Mandate was that some of the main funders of the AJA, such as the Sassoon and Kadoorie families,
were of Iraqi origin. These families partially used the AJA to oversee some of their charitable actions in Iraq. In
Iraq, the AJA was responsible for providing humanitarian aid in the form of financial support and in sending
specialists, such as teachers and medical professionals, to help the Jewish community, in addition to assisting the
Jewish lay council in Baghdad to liaise with the British authorities in Iraq.
35The National Archives of the UK—CO/733/268/6.
36The National Archives of the UK—see files beginning with CO/733.
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Beyond the inquiry from the British Foreign Office, what surely vexed the
Iraqi government is that general foreign newspapers maintained an interest
in Levy. Two days after the JTA piece, the Manchester Guardian also pro-
vided an update on the Levy case.37 They published additional information
not mentioned in the JTA notice of Levy’s arrest. Specifically, they contacted
the Iraqi legation in the United Kingdom for comment on the Levy affair.
The legation stated that their only knowledge of the case was derived from
newspapers and that they were therefore unable to comment on the matter.
The newspaper also contacted the Foreign Office, which also described
having no information and that they would continue to have no information
unless the person in question was a British subject, which Levy was not. It is
not possible to know if the Iraqi legation to the United Kingdom had any
supplemental information about Levy or any directives from Baghdad as to
how to respond to such inquiries; however, it is plausible that they had been
informed not to make any public statement in the hope of de-escalating the
situation. The British Foreign Office, however, was certainly lying, as the
Foreign Office records provide a private narrative of the Levy case that
parallels the public narrative given in the press.
As already mentioned, the British Foreign Office was aware of the bans on
foreign Jewish press entering Iraq prior to the publication of the Levy letter,
as the remarks were bundled with general observations on the increasing
difficulties which Jews in Iraq were facing, such as dismissals from public
service, harassment in the street and, in a few cases, trouble in immigrating
to Palestine, all issues which Levy does not mention in his letter.38 As reports
from F. H. Humphreys of the British Embassy in Baghdad make clear, both
the British Foreign Office and the Jewish communities of England and Iraq
were closely watching the situation and negotiating with the Iraqi govern-
ment about these restrictions via the British Foreign Office.
After the letter’s publication and during the subsequent trial, the Iraqi
government remained relatively inactive as they let Iraqi press criticize Levy
in particular and the Jewish community of Iraq in general. This is significant,
as criticizing a particular religious community as such was contrary to these
same censorship laws, but the government initially chose not to react. When
pushed to comment, their remarks were extremely limited, simply stating
that Levy “had no business criticizing his country in the columns of a foreign
paper” and that the Iraqi government was averse to racial discrimination,
seeing Jewish, Christians, and Muslims alike as citizens and that the Levy case
was an issue of defamation unrelated to the general treatment of minorities.39
37Manchester Guardian, November 16, 1934, 14.
38The National Archives of the UK, Kew—CO 733/275/4. Hong Kong Heritage Project Archive, Hong Kong—SEK
8 C-001 A02/15.
39Jewish Tribune, Bombay, March 1935, 33.
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In his report to the Kadoorie family in Asia, Nahum postulates that the
lack of action by the government is either due to negligence or weakness.40 In
reality, the latter—weakness—is more plausible. In the summer of 1934,
Prime Minister Jamil al-Mafdai resigned after less than ten months in office
and ‘Ali Jawdat al-Aiyubi accepted the position of Prime Minister. Jawdat
came into office with a full plate of pressing issues, particularly growing
sectarianism from tribal groups, Shi’is, and Kurds, to name a few of Iraq’s
many religious and ethnic groups which were also unsure of their status in
the new republic. There were also issues in regard to the shortcomings of the
new king in comparison to his father, and questions over what Iraq’s
relationship with Great Britain should be41; in comparison to these issues,
the issue of foreign Jewish press was relatively minor.
The initial ban on Jewish newspapers and the reaction to the Levy letter
must be understood in this context of a weak government trying to manage
these many potential crises. It is possible that the initial bans on foreign
Jewish press had been a poorly conceived attempt from that state to mini-
mize any Iraqi Jewish involvement in the Zionist movement and shield the
community (albeit in a paternalistic fashion) from any such accusations from
other groups within the country. However, given the negative press this
policy garnered from abroad after the publication of the Levy letter, it
obviously had the opposite effect by drawing attention to the Iraqi Jewish
community from abroad and giving the local press fodder to accuse the Jews
of Zionist leanings, ultimately further degrading the Jewish position in Iraq.
In sum, after the publication of the letter, the Iraqi government most likely
wanted to de-escalate the situation as quickly and as quietly as possible with a
goal of minimizing confessional tension and drawing as little negative atten-
tion from the West as possible.
The sentencing of Levy
The actual sentencing of Levy is indicative of this desire to de-escalate and
the government incapacity to do so in a smooth manner. Initially, Levy was
sentenced to one year of hard labor followed by one year of police
surveillance.42 Levy’s sentence was then tried and re-tried several times in
the months following the initial conviction, as he appealed the case.43 After
his imprisonment, the case was reopened when an Iraqi merchant residing in
London claimed that his business suffered due to Levy’s letter, resulting in
the loss of 2000 pounds revenue, causing the High Court to fine Levy
40Hong Kong Heritage Project Archive—SEK 8 C-001 A02/15.
41Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Iraqi 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social, and Economic History (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 1953), 238–240.
42Israel: Hebomodaire Juif Independent, Cairo, May 5, 1935, 3.
43Palestine Post, Jerusalem, December 24, 1934, 5.
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seventy-five pounds in damages.44 The case was later reopened again when
Levy appealed, the charges being dropped at one point and then revised.
Finally, in June 1935, eight months after the letter was published, the fine was
dropped and his prison stay was shortened to six months, three of which he
had already served after his initial conviction.45 That Levy was able to appeal
his case and that his punishment was consistently changing yet again shows
the strange predicament in which the Iraqi state found itself, specifically its
desire to develop a secular democracy and its inability to do so.
Throughout the trial, the official government message was consistent, if
relatively quiet, specifically that Levy was being tried as an Iraqi citizen for his
public critique of the state. And although they allowed the Arabic language
press to attack the Jewish community directly after the publication of the letter,
as the affair dragged on, the government took certain steps to reassure the
Jewish and key diplomatic partners, such as the British government, as to the
safety of Jewish life in Iraq. This included temporarily banning the Arabic
language newspaper Hedaya due to its virulent anti-Semitic articles and closing
down another anti-Jewish newspaper, al-Ikab, only ten weeks after its
founding.46 The actions can be seen not only as an olive branch to the
Jewish community, assuring them that the government still valued their
place in the country, but also as reassurance for the international community
and an attempt to quell international criticism. From the most pragmatic
perspective, the Jewish community was one of the most visible and interna-
tionally connected minorities in Iraq. If the government was to demonstrate to
the West that they were a reliable and stable developing country, it was
essential to end this conflict promptly and quietly.
The acts were successful in that both Jewish and non-Jewish newspapers
reported the banning of the anti-Jewish newspapers, interpreting this as a
symbol of the government’s desire to protect the Jewish community. Within
a global context, these actions are particularly significant in that they are the
opposite of the actions that Germany was taking towards its Jewish commu-
nity at the same time, a point also not missed by Jewish and non-Jewish
press.47 Specifically, the Iraqi state was seen as taking measures to protect the
Jewish community by shutting down anti-Semitic factions in the press and,
in general, distancing itself from anything that could be perceived as anti-
Semitic. This can be seen, moreover, as an attempt by the Iraqi government
to prove to Europe that it was capable of maintaining a pluralist nation where
all minorities had rights and were equal citizens.
In March 1935, the short-lived regime of Jawdhat was over, and after a
two-week return to office by Mafdai, his government fell as well, events
44The National Archives of the UK, Kew—CO 733/275/6.
45Israel: Hebomodaire Juif Independent, Cairo, June 20, 1935, 4.
46JTA, December 4, 1934, http://www.jta.org/jta-archive/archive-page.
47The National Archives of the UK, Kew—CO 733/275/4, JTA bulletin 94.
296 S. GOLDSTEIN-SABBAH
consistent with the weakness of the Iraqi government during this period. In
April, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency noted that the new government, under
the leadership of Yassin Pasha al-Hashimi, “consists of broad-minded min-
isters many of whom are very friendly and disposed toward the Jews,” a point
confirmed in internal documents from the British Foreign Office, which
concluded that the Levy crisis was coming to a close. It also noted that it
was now possible for the banned newspapers to be allowed back into Iraq.48
And yet, it is difficult to glean the efficiency of Levy’s letter in resolving the
issue of censorship of the Jewish press and the opening of foreign post
addressed to Jews, especially considering that new bans on foreign Jewish
press were issued in March 1936. The new ban also focused on newspapers
with a Zionist philosophy as part of the new laws against Zionism, meaning
that Levy’s letter was unsuccessful in its objective of lifting the ban on Jewish
periodicals.49
However, this small incident had other less tangible and longer-lasting
consequences as well. Within Iraq, it forced the Jewish communal leadership
of Baghdad to address the issue of discrimination and Zionism publically, a
role it was never comfortable in undertaking. The international attention
should not be perceived as emboldening the Jewish community; instead, it
should be seen as publically highlighting questions of conflicting loyalties.
The incident also forced members of the Jewish community to consider what
the new Iraqi nation could possibly look like in the post-Faisal era. For all of
the pluralist discourse of the state, this incident reminded the Jewish com-
munity of its relative weakness as a religious minority. Finally, it put Iraq on
the radar of the Jewish world as a country whose Jewish minority could
potentially be in danger.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the story of Mr. Levy, a middle-class bookseller, is but one
very small part in the history of the Jews of Baghdad. However, it demon-
strates the agency one man in Baghdad had in addressing what he perceived
as a social injustice by bringing it to an international audience. His actions
forced both communal elites and the Iraqi government to publically address
the issue of the Jewish community’s relationship to other Jewish commu-
nities, especially the Jewish community in Palestine, which was growing in
importance. It is unclear how much Levy knew of the Jewish communal
leadership’s lobbying to the Iraqi government in regard to the censorship of
Jewish newspapers or the inquiries made by the Anglo-Jewish Association via
the British Foreign Office on behalf of both the foreign publishers and the
48Ibid.
49Ibid.
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Iraqi Jewish leadership. Perhaps, had he known about their work, he would
not have risked compromising himself by writing such a critical public letter.
On a larger scale, this event illustrates the complicated predicament the
Jews of Iraq found themselves in in the 1930s, both on a communal level and
an individual level. Years of cooperation with foreign Jewish organizations
had built strong ties with foreign Jewish communities, who acted as both
benefactors for local charities and negotiators with the Iraqi government. In
particular, the AJA had grown in importance as a political advisor and
negotiator for the lay council during the Mandate period. However, in the
post-Mandate period, certain factions of the Iraqi government began to
consciously distance themselves from Britain. That the Jewish community
maintained these strong ties with Britain (particularly via the AJA, but also
via other channels) was another factor, beyond Zionism, leading to their
loyalty to the Iraqi state being called into question.
That the Jews of Baghdad were interested in Jewish world news and
maintaining personal ties with Jews living outside of Iraq was understand-
able, as many Iraqis had both personal and commercial ties to other Jewish
communities, meaning that the censorship of Jewish newspapers and the
opening of letters was not only upsetting but potentially problematic for
commercial interests. At the same, since Iraqi independence, many Jews had
grown to see themselves as members of the Iraqi nation culturally, linguis-
tically, and socially. It is unlikely that the majority of the population was
willing to sacrifice one identity or relationship for the other, and thus there
was a constant attempt to maintain an equilibrium between the two.
For other Jews in Baghdad, the issue of censorship was not the main
concern during this period. As Nahum mentions in his report, the issue
of censorship was a point that could be sorted out (and eventually was,
at least temporarily), and his concerns came from larger disconcerting
trends he saw emerging within the state. Iraqi society itself was changing
at a rapid pace, leading Nahum to question the value of the Jewish
community in Iraq to Iraqi society as a whole in the future. As
Nahum notes, with the improvement of public education and a growing
Arab50 educated middle-class, there was less need for Jews in the civil
service, a process he sees as already having begun, given the recent
dismissals of certain Jewish government officials.51 This trend would
also spill over into the private sector, as other Iraqis began to speak
Western languages, leading to a decrease in the need for Jews to act as a
cultural bridge between the two societies. And yet, even when consider-
ing the problems for Jews in Iraq, according to Nahum, the actual
50Nahum, in his writing, generally refers to Arab Muslims as simply Arabs; therefore, I interpret his use of the term
Arab here to only refer to Arab Muslims and not Arab Christians.
51Hong Kong Heritage Project Archive, Hong Kong—SEK 8 C-001 A02/15.
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situation of Jews in Baghdad had been sensationalized by the foreign
press, giving the West an inaccurate perspective. Nahum even states that
the Syrian and Palestinian Muslim newspapers52 remained much worse
than the actual Iraqi newspapers. He also makes mention of the perse-
cution of the Jews in Germany, a constant theme throughout the Levy
affair, clarifying that Iraq was nothing like Germany. Nahum’s letter to
the Kadoories is contradictory in nature in that it recognizes the troubles
facing the Jewish community in the first half, questioning the future of
Jewish life in Iraq, and yet, in the second part, tries to downplay the
same troubles, providing excuses and justifications. Similarly, Levy’s
letter is conflicted in that it compliments certain aspects of the Iraqi
government and only choses to address one of the issues facing the
Jewish community, as opposed to discussing the deeper issues causing
the recent censorship.
Both Levy and Nahum position themselves as Jews, part of a larger Jewish
community living in Iraq. Both men’s livelihoods depended on their connec-
tions to Jews from other communities, Levy via the importation of Jewish
press and Nahum from his employment by the Kadoorie family, not to
mention the likely affinities they had with Jews living outside of Iraq.
Within their writings, private government documents, and the press, words
such as race, minority, and religious group are constantly used interchange-
ably in reference to the Jewish community of Baghdad. Their link to Iraq as a
place and also to the nation is never questioned, and yet their identity, both
ascribed by others and through personal appellations, is never clearly
defined, and at least in the case of Nahum is constantly changing based on
language, audience, and emotion. Therefore, the assertion by the sociologist
Philip Mendes that “overall, Jews [in Iraqi] viewed themselves as Arabs of the
Jewish faith, rather than as a separate race or nationality” seems flawed. In
reality, these identities were surely fluid and positioned in different ways,
depending on context, constantly being redefined.
In conclusion, the story of E. Levy’s public protestation of Iraqi government
policies and the conflict that ensued illustrates the emerging dichotomy of the
Iraqi Jewish identity whereby, tragically, being an Iraqi citizen and a Jew (with
transnational Jewish connections) were becomingmutually exclusive. This event
shows the complexity of how the Jewish community interpreted the changing
political scene in Iraq, using the political situation of Jews in Germany (and later
Europe as a whole) as a litmus test for their situation, whereas we do not see
comparisons to other minorities in Iraq who were facing their own problems,
such as the Assyrians. It also shows that the Jewish communal leadership,
although generally loathe to engage in public political statements or directly
52Although Nahum generally uses the term Arab when referring to Muslims, in this case Nahum specifically uses
the expression “Muslim newspapers,” perhaps to distinguish from Jewish and Christian Arabic-language
newspapers.
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confront the government, was willing to defendmembers of the Jewish commu-
nity, even regarding sensitive subjects, showing that, from at least a structural
perspective, a strong communal identity existed.
Ironically, in many ways Levy’s letter was successful, in that it forced
both the Jewish community and the Iraqi government to squarely confront
the issue of Zionism in regard to the Jewish community of Iraq. His letter
also contributed to the temporary lifting of the newspaper ban and the
censorship of foreign Jewish post. And yet, the outcome was frustrating, in
that it never fully addressed the issue at hand, namely reconciling two
loyalties which were quickly becoming conflicted, that of the Iraqi national
and contemporary Jew.
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